One of the main underlying themes is whether China could reverse
engineer major AP1000 technological advances such as improved quieter reactor coolant pumps
and digital instrumentation and control (I&C) system. ... these
types of coolant pumps could provide China within much quieter nuclear submarines and the
I&C system could enhance the reliability of China’s naval reactors with the caveat that China
already has some experience in I&C systems and the U.S. NRC has expressed some concern
about software glitches in such systems. Quieter and more reliable nuclear systems on
submarines can give a country a distinct advantage in ware. China is struggling with
developing a “blue water” navy in general and with deploying nuclear power projection
capability beyond its coastal waters in particular. Presently China has a very small nuclear
naval fleet which has rarely sailed into deep blue water far from China’s coast. Thus China
would likely welcome and work hard to apply any technology that could offer China the needed
jumpstart to improve the reliability of its nuclear submarines.
China has already displayed its ability to reverse engineer (or “guo chan hua” in Chinese) other
militarily useful technologies. In the late 1970s China acquired intact U.S. Mark 46 torpedoes.
Although the reverse engineering of this torpedo system was a daunting technical challenge
China accomplished this feat in eight years giving it an enhanced naval power capability. It is
also known that China had reverse engineered Soviet-designed ballistic missiles submarines
and other military equipment. Tellingly in 2001 the Bush administration was worried about the
possibility of China reverse engineering the intelligence gathering technology on the EP-3E
plane that was forced to land on Hainan Island after an incident with a Chinese fighter jet.
The crew of the American intelligence gathering plane tried to destroy as much of the equipment as
possible before the Chinese gained control of the plane.